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ABSTRACT
Crowdfunding has emerged as a prominent way for entrepreneurs
to secure funding without sophisticated intermediation. In crowd-
funding, an entrepreneur often has to decide how to disclose the
campaign status in order to collect as many contributions as pos-
sible. Such decisions are difficult to make primarily due to incom-
plete information. We propose information design as a tool to help
the entrepreneur to improve revenue by influencing backers’ be-
liefs. We introduce a heuristic algorithm to dynamically compute
information-disclosure policies for the entrepreneur, followed by
an empirical evaluation to demonstrate its competitiveness over the
widely-adopted immediate-disclosure policy. Our results demon-
strate that the immediate-disclosure policy is not optimal when
backers follow thresholding policies despite its ease of implementa-
tion. With appropriate heuristics, an entrepreneur can benefit from
dynamic information disclosure. Our work sheds light on infor-
mation design in a dynamic setting where agents make decisions
using thresholding policies.
INTRODUCTION
Crowdfunding reinvents the way that entrepreneurs raise external
funding for implementing creative ideas. It has created a rapidly
growing market that contributes an annual economic impact of
tens of billions of US dollars globally [45]. Unfortunately, not all the
crowdfunding campaigns are successful because most campaigns
will get funded only if they have reached the fundraising goal within
a deadline [37]. In fact, less than 40% of the crowdfunding projects
reach the targeted goals and receive the funds within the campaign
deadlines [37].
Mounting research has begun to investigate the determinants
of the success of crowdfunding projects. Although there might be
many factors (e.g., project descriptions [26], product value [1], geog-
raphy effect [2], reward details [26], entrepreneurs’ reputation [23]
and the social network effect [1]) that influence a campaign’s suc-
cess, a recent study indicates that the number of donations made
by early backers of a project is often the only difference between
that project being funded or not [39]. A substantial body of both
theoretical analyses [1, 3, 28] and empirical evidence [13, 23, 26, 38]
demonstrate that the amount of early contributions has a strong
positive effect on the success of crowdfunding campaigns. These
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prior studies unanimously confirm the crucial role of early contri-
butions in the success of crowdfunding projects.
There are two main reasons why the amount of early contri-
butions matters. First, information about contributions received
early in the campaign signals to potential backers the quality of the
project, which in turn can trigger social learning behavior [7] caus-
ing potential backers to also contribute to the campaign [13]. An
empirical study on a sample of 25,058 Kickstarter projects indicates
that prospective backers usually make their pledging decisions
based on how much of the project goal has already been funded by
others [23]. Second, backers who have made an early contribution
are likely to circulate the information of the project to their friends
or families, which may attract additional contributions [13, 38].
Both rationales indicate that it is of interest to entrepreneurs to
attract as many contributions from early backers as possible.
In crowdfunding, backers are often reluctant to donate in the
early days of a campaign due to high uncertainty [3, 13, 23, 28, 39].
A major source of uncertainty is the probability of success that the
campaign will get funded (i.e., Probability of Success, or PoS) [13, 23].
Prospective backers are often uncertain about entrepreneurs’ abili-
ties to collect sufficient contributions to get the project funded. For
instance, 64.12% of the crowdfunding projects in Kickstarter failed
to reach the target goals [21]. A backer 1 experiences a monetary
or non-monetary opportunity cost if the fundraising goal is not
achieved (and the project not funded), even if he is refunded upon
the failure of the campaign [3].
To attract asmany early contributions as possible, an entrepreneur
must take appropriate measures to coordinate backers’ actions. To
do this, the entrepreneur needs to have prior knowledge about the
backers’ arrival process, their valuation of the project (if funded),
and how they estimate the probability that the campaign will be
funded. However, none of this information is perfectly known to
the entrepreneur. Thus, it is challenging for the entrepreneur to
figure out what actions will make backers, especially early backers,
be more willing to contribute.
If conditions permit, the entrepreneur can manipulate backers’
payoffs by offering appealing discounts to early backers that face
high uncertainty [16, 40]. The problem of devising allocation and
payment schemes falls into the field ofmechanism design [29].While
illuminating, it requires additional budgets and thus diminishes
the entrepreneur’s revenue [16, 41]. Absent from sophisticated or
even unrealistic assumptions of the backers’ private types (e.g.,
valuation, arrival time, departure time), it is rather difficult or
even unfeasible for the entrepreneur to implement effective mecha-
nisms [16, 41]. This is particularly the case in online settings where
1We will use “she" to denote an entrepreneur and “he" a backer/agent.
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the entrepreneur has little knowledge about how the backers make
their projections of the campaign’s PoS.
Alternatively, the entrepreneur can improve backers’ beliefs of
the campaign’s PoS by choosing what information backers see. In
particular, the entrepreneur can and is permitted to voluntarily
disclose the project status (i.e., how many contributions have been
collected up to a given timestamp), a critical factor that influences
backers’ beliefs of the campaign’s PoS [3, 23]. The problem of de-
termining which pieces of information are disclosed to whom is
called information design [43].
Prior work on information design has generally assumed that
backers’ strategic behavior was perfectly rational and that games
were well-defined (e.g., signaling games) [4, 8–10, 43]. However,
studies on consumer purchasing behavior show that buyers usually
follow thresholding policies to decide whether to purchase goods
or not [18, 20, 46]. They often buy products when the prices are no
more than their reserved values. This is particularly the case when
consumers face high degrees of uncertainty and have little knowl-
edge about the environment or the future, as frequently observed in
clinical decision making [31], crowdsourcing contests [15], airline
ticket sales [46], online shopping [25], management science [42],
societies of autonomous machines [34] and crowdfunding [3, 28].
Under certain circumstances, thresholding policies are optimal poli-
cies and hence represent rational behavior [30]. We thus consider
the scenario where backers follow thresholding policies when they
decide whether to contribute to a project or not.
In this paper, we study the information design problem in which
an entrepreneur voluntarily reveals the project status to backers to
influence their beliefs of the project’s probability of success. Our
work contributes to the state of the art in the following ways:
(1) We show that excessive information disclosureweakly shrinks
the entrepreneur’s revenue. We identify conditions when im-
mediate disclosure is optimal in crowdfunding when agents
follow thresholding policies. We demonstrate that immediate
disclosure is optimal if the funding goal has been achieved
and if the project status increases monotonically by at least
one contribution each time.
(2) We introduce a heuristic algorithm calledDynamic Shrinkage
with Heuristic Selection (DSHS) to to help the entrepreneur
make decisions on information-disclosure policies.
(3) We conducted extensive simulations with real-world dataset
to compare the performance of the DSHS algorithm with the
widely-adopted information-disclosure policy. Experimental
results demonstrate that despite its computational efficiency,
the immediate-disclosure policy is not optimal when agents
follow thresholding policies. Entrepreneurs can benefit from
dynamic information design with appropriate heuristics.
DECISION MAKING IN CROWDFUNDING
After introducing key notations, we formalize backers’ decision
model and the entrepreneur’s optimization problem in a crowd-
funding campaign.
Preliminaries
We consider discrete time t ∈ T = {1, 2, 3, ...,T }, where T is the
deadline for the campaign. Before launching the campaign, the
entrepreneur must determine a fundraising goal G to get funded,
a deadline T for reaching the goal, the number of rewards N , the
minimal amount of contributions for a reward P , and a detailed
description of the project such as motivation, product, milestones,
and profiles of the team. All this information is fixed and is dis-
closed to all the backers. See Figure 1 for the procedure of a typical
crowdfunding campaign.
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Figure 1: Procedure of a typical crowdfunding campaign.
After the campaign starts to accept contributions, backers arrive
at the campaign sequentially with at most one each time. This is
without loss of generality because batch arrivals can be viewed
as a special case where the time interval is minimal [3, 36]. Let
b(t) ∈ {0, 1} denote the number of arrivals at time t ∈ T .
At the beginning of time t , the entrepreneur discloses the state of
the campaign (i.e., project status) s(k) to each backer i that is in the
campaign. Here, s(k) = (Sk ,k) where Sk refers to the percentage of
funds that have been raised up to time k ≤ t (k not included), with
respect to the fundraising goalG . For simplicity, let |s(k)| = Sk . We
denote the entrepreneur’s decision on information disclosure for
backer i at time t by:
d(i, t) = (s(k), t) s.t. k ∈ T ,k ≤ t . (1)
Here, |s(1)| = 0. The disclosed project status s(k) must reflect
the true state of the project at time k , which is enforced by the
crowdfunding platform. In real-world crowdfunding campaigns,
entrepreneurs are allowed to voluntarily disclose truthful project
status [3, 39]. In our work, we assume that any information about
the project status observed by the backers is directly revealed by the
entrepreneur. Future work should address the scenarios when back-
ers have exogenous information due to information contagion [5].
Backers’ Decision Model
It is widely known that backers’ beliefs of PoS are usually correlated
with the entrepreneur’s updates of the project status [3, 23, 24,
26]. However, the exact correlation is privately known to a backer
himself only and not observed by the entrepreneur. This makes it
difficult to accurately model backers’ decision making process. To
tackle this problem, we formalize backers’ decision model using the
same pattern as that in the work [30] by Ohannessian et al., which
also assumes that agents use thresholding policies.
Let ri (t ,d(i, t)) ∈ [0, 1] represent high-value backer i’s estimate
of the campaign’s PoS given the report d(i, t), and ϕi ∈ (0, 1] be his
threshold on ri (·) to contribute. We denote backer i’s decision on
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whether to contribute or not at time t by αi (t) ∈ {0, 1}, where 0 in-
dicates Not Pledging, and 1 represents Pledging. Backer i’s expected
utility ui is determined as follows:
ui (t ,αi (t),d(i, t)) =
{
ci · αi (t) , if ri (t ,d(i, t)) ≥ ϕi ;
0 , otherwise.
(2)
Here, ci > 0 is backer i’s expected utility if he contributes (i.e.,
αi (t) = 1) when his estimate of PoS is no less than the threshold
ϕi . Note that ci , ri (·) and ϕi are all private information known to
backer i only, while his arrival and pledging behavior are observed
by the entrepreneur through the platform. In practice, backer i may
adapt to the environment and update his threshold accordingly. In
this case, his threshold ϕi can be treated like the upper bound of
all the updated thresholds. Without loss of generality, we assume
that each contributing backer pledges the same amount P of fund
to the project for a reward.
Backer i stays at the campaign for at most li ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..,L}
periods, where li is known to backer i only. This is without loss
of generality because although backers may dynamically enter
and exit the system and check the progress, these situations can
be viewed as the case that the backers stay in the system for a
sufficient period.
Let I(t) denote the group of backers who have arrived at the
campaign before or at time t , have at least one time period to leave
and have not yet claimed a contribution. At time t , for each backer
i ∈ I(t), his objective function is
Bi (t) = max
αi (t )
ui (t ,αi (t),d(i, t)) s. t. G,T ,N , P , li , (3)
where ui is determined by Equation 2. At time t , backer i will leave
the campaign either if he claims a contribution (i.e., αi (t) = 1) or
his own deadline li is reached.
The Entrepreneur’s Optimization Problem
In crowdfunding, the entrepreneur is interested in attracting as
many contributions as possible within the deadline so that her
project will get funded. Specifically, her objective is to set the dis-
closure policy such that the number of contributions is maximized
until a given deadline T .
Let M(t) denote the funds that the entrepreneur has raised up
to time t (t included) when she uses the disclosure policy DP(t).
Here, DP(t) = (((d(i, t ′))i ∈I(t ′))t ′≤t . The entrepreneur’s expected
contributions at time t is defined as follows:
M(t) =
t∑
t ′=1
∑
i ∈I(t ′)
αi (t ′) · P s. t. G,T ,N , P . (4)
Due to the deadline constraint, the entrepreneur’s optimization
problem (i.e., optimal information design) is formalized as follows:
Definition 1 (Optimal Information Design). An optimal informa-
tion design in crowdfunding is to find a disclosure policy DPopt (T ),
such thatM(T ) is maximized, i.e., DPopt = argmax
DP (T )
M(T ).
Due to the dynamic nature of crowdfunding, the design of dis-
closure policy DP(t) cannot be based on backers’ later decisions
(α j (tˆ)j ∈I(tˆ ))tˆ>t , or use later project status (s(tˆ))tˆ>t . This constraint
is called No Clairvoyance.
OPTIMAL INFORMATION DESIGN
After introducing the solution concepts, we show that excessive
information weakly shrinks revenue. We further identify conditions
under which immediate disclosure is optimal in crowdfunding.
Solution Concepts
In his seminal work [11], Blackwell formulated a partial order that
is capable of comparing the quality of two pieces of information
(see Theorem 1). According to Blackwell’s theorem, if a piece of
information ζ2 is Blackwell-inferior to ζ1, then an agent will always
weakly prefer ζ1 to ζ2.
Theorem 1 (Blackwell’s theorem [11]). Let ζ1 and ζ2 represent two
pieces of information, the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) When the agent chooses ζ1, her expected utility is always at
least as big as the expected utility when she chooses ζ2, in-
dependent of the utility function and the distribution of the
input.
(2) ζ2 is a garbling of ζ1.
Blackwell’s theorem implies two types of information: vertical
information and horizontal information, which are key solution
concepts used in this work. Given two pieces of information, if one
is always (weakly) preferred whatever the information receivers’
types are, then they are vertical information (see Definition 2). If the
two pieces of information are not comparable without prior knowl-
edge about the receivers’ types, then the information is horizontal
(definition omitted since it complements vertical information).
Definition 2 (Vertical Information). Given two pieces of infor-
mation ζ1 and ζ2, where ζ1 , ζ2, if ∀i ∈ I, ui (ζ1) ≥ ui (ζ2), then
ζ1 ≿ ζ2, where I denotes a set of agents and≿, indicating preferred
or indifferent to, is independent of agent i’s private type. If ζ1 ≿ ζ2,
the information is vertical.
In crowdfunding, backer i’s estimate of the campaign’s PoS (i.e.,
ri (t ,d(i, t))) is both time and state-dependent. Both the amount of
funding (measured by |s(k)|) raised, and the time of the project
status (denoted by k) are important. We identify three scenarios
of vertical information. First, a higher state of project status is
always more favorable if the time of the state is the same (e.g.,
(20%, 5) ≿ (10%, 5)), which is obvious. Second, the earlier report of
project status is always (weakly) preferred if the project status of
the two reports are the same (see Proposition 1). Third, the later
report of project status is always (weakly) preferred if the revenue
increases by more than P each time between the timestamps of the
two statuses. (see Proposition 2). All the proofs can be found in
Appendix A.
Proposition 1. An earlier report of project status is always weakly
preferred if the project status of the two reports are the same. Formally,
given project status s(k1) and s(k2), where k1 < k2, |s(k1)| = |s(k2)|,
we have ∀t ≥ k2,∀i ∈ I(t): (s(k1), t) ≿ (s(k2), t).
Proposition 2. A later report of project status is always weakly
preferred if the revenue increases by more than P each time between
the period of the two statuses. Given status reports ε1 : (s(k1), t1)
and ε2 : (s(k2), t2), where k1 < k2, t1 < t2 and |s(k2)| − |s(k1)| ≥
(k2 − k1) · P/G, we have ∀t ≥ k2,∀i ∈ I(t): ε2 ≿ ε1.
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If the conditions of vertical information cannot be identified, the
information is horizontal (see Example 1). Without prior informa-
tion about backers’ private types (e.g., arrival process, valuation, the
estimate of the campaign’s PoS, and the correlation between them),
it is not feasible for the entrepreneur to identify optimal information
design. However, an effective disclosure policy should capture both
the vertical and horizontal component, making the information
design problem particularly challenging for the entrepreneur.
Example 1. Given T = 30, P = 0.1G, |s(10)| = 30% and |s(15)| =
40%, without prior knowledge about backer i’s projection of PoS
(i.e., ri (·)), it is unclear which project status is more favorable by i .
This is because |s(15)| − |s(10)| = 0.1 < 0.1 · (15 − 10).
Excessive Disclosure Shrinks Revenue
Given two project status reports, if their partial order can be identi-
fied according to Proposition 1 and 2, then the entrepreneur only
needs to disclose the one with higher order. This is because reveal-
ing the low-order report does not increase the chance that backers
contribute to the campaign (see Lemma 1).
Lemma 1. If the order of two project status reports can be identi-
fied, the low-order report does not increase the change of backers’
contribution. Formally, given project status reports ε1 : (s(k1), t1) and
ε2 : (s(k2), t2), if ∀t ≥ max{k1,k2},k1 , k2,∀i ∈ I(t) : ε2 ≿ ε1, we
have :
E(αi = 1|ε2) ≥ E(αi = 1|(ε1, ε2)) , (5)
where E(αi = 1|ε) denotes the expectation that backer i contributes
to the campaign given the information ε .
If the partial order of the two reports cannot be identified, the
entrepreneur should also refrain from disclosing additional infor-
mation. Depending on how backers estimate the campaign’s PoS, re-
vealing more information than necessary can decrease the revenue.
The reason is that excessive information disclosure can decrease
backers’ projections of the PoS (See Lemma 2).
Lemma 2. If the partial order of the two project status reports
cannot be identified, excessive information disclosure weakly de-
crease backers’ projections of PoS. Formally, given project status re-
ports ε1 : (s(k1), t1) and ε2 : (s(k2), t2) where k1 , k2, if the par-
tial order of the two cannot be identified by the entrepreneur, then
∀t ≥ max{k1,k2},∀i ∈ I(t), we have:
ri (t , (ε1, ε2)) ≤ max{ri (t , ε1), ri (t , ε2)} . (6)
In our model of crowdfunding, excessive information disclo-
sure weakly diminishes a backer’s willingness to contribute (see
Theorem 2) and thus weakly shrinks the revenue as well as the
entrepreneur’s ability to implement optimal information-disclosure
policies. To collect asmany contributions as possible, the entrepreneur
should not disclose more information about the project status than
necessary.
Theorem 2. Excessive information disclosure weakly diminishes
the chance that a backer will contribute. Formally, given two project
status reports ε1 : (s(k1), t1) and ε2 : (s(k2), t2) where k1 , k2, let
α
′
i denote backer i’s decision on pledging if given report either ε1
or ε2, and α
′′
i denote his decision on contribution if given (ε1, ε2).
∀t ≥ max{k1,k2},∀i ∈ I(t), we have: E(α ′i = 1) ≥ E(α
′′
i = 1).
Immediate Disclosure is not Always Optimal
The immediate-disclosure policy (see Definition 3) is widely adopted
by entrepreneurs on major crowdfunding platforms (e.g., Kick-
starter, Indiegogo) due to its ease of implementation [3]. It is thus
important to investigate if immediate disclosure is optimal.
Definition 3 (Immediate Disclosure). An immediate-disclosure
policy always reveals the current project status to all the backers
in the campaign. Formally let DPim denote immediate disclosure,
we have DPim (t) = (((d(j, t ′))j ∈I(t ′))t ′≤t s.t. d(j, t ′) = (s(t ′), t ′).
If the entrepreneur and the backers have identical information,
immediate disclosure is optimal [6, 19, 32]. It still holds if the en-
trepreneur has some unique information provided that such in-
formation does not affect the backers’ decisions. Unfortunately,
in our model, all information about the campaign (e.g., G,T , P ,N )
except the project status is known to both the entrepreneur and the
backers. Backer i’s estimate of PoS (i.e., ri (t ,d(i, t))) is influenced
by the project status s(k) that the entrepreneur reveals. Thus, it is
critical for the entrepreneur to identify conditions when immediate
disclosure is optimal.
From Proposition 2, we see that to improve backer i’s belief of the
campaign’s PoS, the entrepreneur should always disclose the project
status that is preferred by all the backers if available. Otherwise,
the information design is not optimal. With this intuition in mind,
we show that before the campaign reaches the fundraising goal,
immediate disclosure is optimal if and only if the project status
increases monotonically in time by at least one contribution each
time (see Lemma 3). This condition characterizes the relationship
between the growth rates of the revenue and the maximum possible
arrival rate of the backers. Though the entrepreneur does not have
prior knowledge of the backers’ types (e.g., beliefs, thresholds), she
can observe the progress of the project and determine if immediate
disclosure is optimal given the tracking record of project status.
Lemma 3. Before the campaign reaches the fundraising goal, im-
mediate disclosure is optimal if and only if the project state increases
monotonically in time by at least one contribution each time. Formally,
ifM(t) < G, then we have:
DPim (t) = argmax
DP (t )
M(t) ⇐⇒ ∀t ′ ≤ t : |s(t ′)| − |s(t ′ − 1)| ≥ P/G .
After successfully reaching the funding objective, it is certain that
the campaign will get funded, so immediate disclosure is optimal
(see Lemma 4).
Lemma 4. After the campaign reaches the fundraising goal, Im-
mediate disclosure is optimal. Formally, ifM(t) ≥ G, then we have:
DPim = argmax
DP (t )
M(t).
Lemma 3 shows that immediate disclosure is not always optimal
during the crowdfunding campaign when backers follow a thresh-
olding policy. According to Definition 1 and Equation 4, in order
to compute the optimal solution, the entrepreneur must have a
prior knowledge of the sequence of decisions ((αi (t))i ∈I(t ))t ∈T in
advance. However, such assumption violates the No Clairvoyance
constraint and is not implementable in practice.
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DYNAMIC INFORMATION DESIGN
Instead of restricting our attention to optimal information design,
we introduce a heuristic algorithm, called Dynamic Shrinkage with
Heuristic Selection (DSHS), to help the entrepreneur make decisions
on information disclosure.
DSHS treats the two conditions separately: before and after
project success (see Algorithm 1) . Before the campaign reaches the
fundraising goal, the algorithm determines the disclosure policy ac-
cording to two processes: dynamic shrinkage (see Algorithm 2) and
heuristic selection. After the campaign reaches the fundraising goal
(if it happens), the algorithm discloses information immediately.
Algorithm 1 DSHS
Input: t - time; s(t) - project status at time t ; I(t)- backers in
the campaign.
Output: (d(i, t))i ∈I(t )- the entrepreneur’s decisions on infor-
mation disclosure for backers in the campaign at time t .
1: if t ≤ T then
2: for each backer i ∈ I(t) do
3: if current revenueM(t) < G then ▷ before success
4: Include all the available project status into Hi (t)
5: Sort Hi (t) in the ascending order of |s(k)|
6: Remove the least promising candidates in Hi (t)
7: Select the project status s(ksel ) using heuristics
8: Finalize disclosure decision d(i, t) ← (s(ksel ), t)
9: else ▷ after success
10: Disclosure current status, i.e., d(i, t) ← (s(t), t)
11: end if
12: Update revenueM(t + 1) = M(t) + αi (t) · P
13: Update project status s(t + 1) = M(t + 1)/G
14: end for
15: end if
Dynamic Shrinkage. In the dynamic-shrinkage process, DSHS
ranks all the available choices, and removes the least promising
choices which are less preferred by the backers according to Propo-
sitions 1 and 2. By doing so, the entrepreneur avoids excessive
information disclosure that weakly shrinks revenue.
Initially, DSHS includes all the project status disclosures s(k)
since the last disclosure for backer i into a set Hi (t). That is,
Hi (t) ← {s(k)}k ∈{k0,k0+1, ...,t } s.t. d(i, t ′) = (s(k0), t ′) , (7)
where t ′ ∈ {1, 2, ..., t}. It then sorts Hi (t) in the ascending order of
|s(k)|. This sorting problem can be easily solved by Quicksort [17]
with time complexity O(|Hi (t)| log |Hi (t)|). Since |Hi (t)| ≤ T , the
worst-case complexity for the function is O(T logT ).
After the sorting process, DSHS removes the least promising
candidates through the function SHRINK (see Algorithm 2). While
there are at least two choices available, the SHRINK algorithm re-
moves the project status with later time if the two statuses have the
same progress (see line 4, Algorithm 2) according to Proposition 1.
This process is equivalent to removing duplicates in a sorted array,
which can be solved inO(T ) time. Given two project statuses, if they
satisfy the relation in Proposition 2, then the algorithm removes
the project status with the earlier time (see line 7, Algorithm 2) .
This step takes O(T logT ) time in the worst case. The algorithm
does nothing if only one disclosure strategy exists.
Algorithm 2 SHRINK
Input: H - sorted project status disclosures
Output: H ′-remaining status disclosures after shrinkage
1: if |H | ≥ 2 then
2: while s(k1), s(k2) ∈ H ,k1 < k2 do
3: if |s(k1)| = |s(k2)| then
4: H ← H \ {s(k2)} ▷ By Proposition 1
5: end if
6: if |s(k2)| − |s(k1)| ≥ (k2 − k1) · P/G then
7: H ← H \ {s(k1)} ▷ By Proposition 2
8: end if
9: end while
10: end if
11: H ′ ← H
Heuristic Selection. After the shrinkage process, if there are still
at least two choices available (i.e., |Hi (t)| ≥ 2), then the remain-
ing set Hi (t) is horizontal. The entrepreneur has to select some
s(ksel ) ∈ Hi (t) to attract as many contributions as possible. This
optimization problem is similar with the renowned restless bandit
problem [44], which is not solvable due to incomplete information.
However, simple heuristics such as random selection, greedy se-
lection, ϵ-greedy exploration, and softmax exploration can be used
to produce acceptable results. See Appendix B for details of each
algorithm.
We further introduce a meta algorithm (See Algorithm 3). The
intuition is that the algorithm can improve the quality of decisions
by only using the experts that have a satisficing performance for
producing the final results [14]. Besides, we take an ensemble ap-
proach to calculate the final selection instead of directly applying
the results produced by the selected experts. The benefit is that
the algorithm can further reduce potential performance loss due to
biases of a single individual expert [22, 35].
Before describing the meta algorithm, we first introduce the
notations used. Let X denote the set of experts, where x ∈ X is
one of the four heuristics. We write zt (x) for expert x ’s expected
revenue at time t and writewt (x) for expert x ’s revenue prospect.
Here, zt (x) is computed by: zt (x) = ∑s(k )∈H ′ ∑i ∈I(t ) ρtx (s(k)) ·
ϒx (s(k), i, t), where ρtx (s(k)) denotes the probability that s(k) is se-
lected as the targeted project status by expert x at t , and ϒx (s(k), i, t)
is the entrepreneur’s expected increase of revenue given (s(k), t) for
backer i ∈ I(t) by using expert algorithm x . Details of computing
ϒx (s(k), i, t) for each expert x is described in Appendix B. Initially,
wt = maxx ∈X {zt (x)}.
Each time the algorithm selects a subset X ′ of experts whose
expected revenue is higher than a learned threshold—the minimum
learned prospectwt (x). This step eliminates the experts that fail to
produce better expected revenue than the threshold. The algorithm
then performs a majority vote from the results generated by each
expert x ∈ X ′. The selected project status s(ksel ) is the one with
the most votes. Ties are broken by choosing the result generated
by the expert with the highest zt (x). This step aims to improve the
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robustness of selection by reducing the performance loss caused
by biases of a single expert.
When a new expert algorithm is selected, the prospect for the
expert is updated by wt (x) = (1 − σ )qt (x) + σwt−δ (x). Here, δ is
the number of periods that expert x has been used, and σ ∈ [0, 1] is
the learning rate ( σ = 0.9 in our paper). qt (x) is the entrepreneur’s
average revenue gain per time by using expert algorithm x in the
last δ periods. It is calculated by: qt (x) = ∑tt ′=t−δ ∑j ∈I(t ′) α j (t ′)δ .
Algorithm 3 META
Input: H ′-remaining status disclosures after shrinkage; X -the
set of experts
Output: s(ksel )-the selected project status disclosure
1: Compute zt (x) for x ∈ X
2: Initializewt (x) = maxx ∈X zt (x)
3: while t < T do
4: X ′ = {x : zt (x) ≥ minwt (x)}
5: Perform a majority vote for s(k) ∈ HX ′
6: Select s(ksel ) as the s(k) with the majority rule
7: Updatewt (x) = (1 − σ )qt (x) + σwt−δ (x) if a new expert x
is selected
8: Update qt (x) and zt (x) for each x ∈ X
9: end while
DSHS is highly flexible in the sense that it allows the entrepreneur
to easily customize both the shrinkage process and the selection
process with different methods.
EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
This section describes the experimental settings and the results.
Experimental Setup. We collected the campaign data from a ran-
domly selected subset of Kickstarter2 projects using a web crawler.
The dataset contains 1,569 projects which satisfy the following
conditions: (1) they were all-or-nothing, reward-based campaigns;
(2) the campaigns lasted for exactly 1,440 hours (60 days) with both
the starting time and the ending time falling between 07/15/2016
and 10/15/2016. Each campaign includes hourly project status, the
fundraising goal, the deadline, the minimal amount of contribution,
and the number of contributions every hour. The data samples al-
low us to mimic the operation of real-world crowdfunding projects
when the underlying factors and correlations that impact them are
yet to be identified [3, 28].
Most of the projects on Kickstarter offer several tiers of perks
for the backers to choose. We only selected the early bird pledges
and the regular pledges that would offer a product to the backers
to compensate backers’ financial support. We adjusted the funding
goal for each project accordingly. The early bird pledges were pro-
portioned to the regular pledges. For instance, an early bird pledge
with value 8 is equivalent to 0.8 regular pledge with value 10.
Due to Kickstarter’s API constraints, we were unable to track the
number of backers who visited the campaign per hour.We simulated
backers’ arrivals using Poisson [33] distribution for each project.
The arrival process was independently and identically distributed
with a mean ϑ (t) across time, where t ∈ T . The mean of (ϑ (t))t ∈T
2https://www.kickstarter.com
was 0.1 (consistent with the empirical arrival rates of backers in
crowdfunding projects [27]).
We used the anticipating random walk [3] model for simulating
backers’ projections of PoS because it is tailored for computing
backers’ estimates of PoS in crowdfunding. For each project, the
backers’ valuation of a reward was Gaussian [33] distributed with
a mean equivalent to the value of the reward P and a randomly
selected standard deviation ranging 0.05 of the mean to 0.5 of the
mean.
We performed six groups of experiments: immediate disclosure
(immediate), and DSHS with five heuristics (random, greedy, ϵ-
greedy, softmax, and meta) . Each group was run 30 times with
the same 2.9GHz quad-core machine.
Results. Figure 2a shows the average revenue (normalized by the
highest revenue achieved in all experiments) obtained in the end
by each group. The actual revenue excluded the projects that failed
(M(T ) < G), while the expected revenue included all the projects
regardless of whether they succeeded to meet the funding goal
or not. Not surprisingly, the expected revenue of each group was
significantly higher than their respective actual revenue. This is
because the majority of the campaigns failed due to not having met
the funding goal within the deadline (see Figure 2c). Among the
six groups, the meta group scored the best for both the expected
revenue (mean = 0.7435, std = 0.0244) and the actual revenue (mean
= 0.3722, std = 0.0092), followed by the softmax group, and the ϵ-
greedy group. The greedy group and the immediate group performed
better than the immediate group in the expected revenue, but not in
the actual revenue due to a lower success rate. The random group
received the lowest scores in terms of both the expected revenue
(mean = 0.3210, std = 0.0273) and the actual revenue (mean = 0.1004,
std = 0.0329).
At the beginning, the immediate, the meta, the greedy, and ϵ-
greedy groups performed better than the other two (see Figure 2b).
As time progressed, the meta and the ϵ-greedy groups continued
to lead the way until the later left behind the former at around
t = 400. The ϵ-greedy group kept the second until at time t = 900
that it was surpassed by the softmax group. One explanation is that
the ϵ-greedy algorithm initially encouraged exploration to a higher
degree than the softmax algorithm. However, it acted more greedily
than the softmax exploration over time, which was not favorable
since better choices were rarely explored. The meta group used a
set of refined policies to produce more robust decisions than the
others. The random group performed the worst possibly because
the random algorithm completely ignored the history of backers’
responses.
The meta algorithm took the most computation time (mean
= 0.2300 std = 0.0290 ), while the random method required the
least time (mean = 0.1037, std = 0.0034) (see Figure 2d). Immediate
disclosure required no additional time.
In summary, although the meta group required the most compu-
tation time, it performed consistently the best among all the groups
in terms of both actual and expected revenue. This echoes our pre-
vious findings that immediate disclosure is not always optimal in
crowdfunding.
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Figure 2: A comparison of performance.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present the very first study on information design
where a sender interacts with multiple receivers that follow thresh-
olding policies. Our work demonstrates that excessive information
disclosure weakly shrinks the revenue in crowdfunding when back-
ers use cutoff policies. It further shows that the widely-adopted
immediate-disclosure policy is not optimal. We also present how
the entrepreneur can benefit from dynamic information disclosure
with appropriate heuristics. To further evaluate the performance
of the heuristic algorithm, user studies and real-world deployment
are needed.
Although our analysis is in the context of crowdfunding and
the DSHS algorithm is intended to help the entrepreneur make
decisions on information disclosure in crowdfunding, extensions to
other domains (e.g., transportation systems, smart grids, and online
shopping) where agents typically use thresholding policies can be
straightforward. For instance, online shopping marketplace can
employ DSHS variants to dynamically reveal the number of prod-
ucts available or the number of products sold to attract potential
buyers to buy the products. Further research is required to assess
the variants’ performance in these domains.
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A PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1
By condition, |s(k1)| = |s(k2)|. That means the revenue does not
increase between time k1 to time k2. Since k1 < k2, we have
T − k2 < T − k1, which means less time is left to achieve the
fundraising goal G. Thus, the campaign’s PoS decreases or stays
the same, regardless of backers’ arrivals from time k1 to k2. That
is, r (t , (s(k1), t)) ≥ r (t , (s(k2), t)). By Equation 2, the utility of all
the subsequently arriving backers weakly decreases, i.e, ∀t ≥
k2,∀i ∈ I(t) : ui ((s(k1), t)) ≥ ui ((s(k2), t)). By Definition 2, we
have (s(k1), t) ≿ (s(k2), t) for all t ≥ k2, and for all i ∈ I(t).
Proof of Proposition 2
By assumption ∀t ∈ T ,b(t) ∈ {0, 1}, we have that the num-
ber of arrivals from time k1 to k2 is:
∑k2
k1
b(t ′) ≤ k2 − k1. Since
|s(k2)|− |s(k1)| ≥ (k2−k1) ·P/G , we have that at least (k2−k1) back-
ers have contributed from time k1 to k2. Without loss of generality,
one can assume that each time from k1 to k2, at least one backer ar-
rives at the campaign and makes a contribution. In other words, the
revenue of the campaign grows faster than or equal to the arrival
of backers between k1 and k2. Thus, the campaign’s PoS increases
or stays the same. That is, r (t , (s(k2), t)) ≥ r (t , (s(k1), t)). By Equa-
tion 2, the utility of all the subsequently arriving backers weakly
increases, i.e., ∀t ≥ k2,∀i ∈ I(t) : ui (s(k2), t2) ≥ ui ((s(k1), t1)). By
Definition 2, we have ∀t ≥ k2,∀i ∈ I(t) : ε2 ≿ ε1.
Proof of Lemma 1
By condition, we have ε2 ≿ ε1. By relation of preferences and
utility[12], ε2 ≿ ε1 ⇐⇒ ui (t , ε2) ≥ ui (t , ε1). According to backers’
utility function (Equation 2), ri (t , ε2) ≥ ri (t , ε1). Depending on
the order of the backer i’s threshold ϕi , his belief ri (t , ε1) when
given report ε1 and the belief ri (t , ε2) given report ε2, there are the
following three cases.
• ri (t , ε1) ≤ ri (t , ε2) < ϕi : in this case, backer i will not con-
tribute to the campaign given either ε2 or (ε1, ε2). That is,
E(αi = 1|ε2) = E(αi = 1|(ε1, ε2)) = 0.
• ri (t , ε1) ≤ ϕi ≤ ri (t , ε2): given report ε2, backer i will con-
tribute to the campaign and leave the system. An additional
signal about the project status cannot improve his possibility
of pledging, i.e, E(αi = 1|ε2) ≥ E(αi = 1|(ε1, ε2)).
• ϕi < ri (t , ε1) ≤ ri (t , ε2): under this condition, backer i will
contribute to the campaign and leave the system given ei-
ther of the two reports. That is, E(αi = 1|ε2) = E(αi =
1|(ε1, ε2)) = 1.
Thus, E(αi = 1|ε2) ≥ E(αi = 1|(ε1, ε2)).
Proof of Lemma 2
We prove it by contradiction. Assume, to the contrary, that ∃t ≥
max{k1,k2}, j ∈ I(t) : r j (t , (ε1, ε2)) > max{r j (t , ε1), r j (t , ε2)}. De-
pending on the order of backer j’s threshold ϕ j , r j (t , (ε1, ε2)), and
max{r j (t , ε1), r j (t , ε2)}, we have the following three cases:
• r j (t , (ε1, ε2)) > max{r j (t , ε1), r j (t , ε2)} ≥ ϕ j : if r j (t , ε1) >
r j (t , ε2), we have r j (t , (ε1, ε2)) > r j (t , ε1) ≥ ϕ j . By utility
function (Equation 2),uj ((ε1, ε2)) = uj (ε1) = c j ·α j (t). By the
relation of preferences and utility [12], (ε1, ε2) ∼ ε1, where ∼
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denotes indifferent to. This contradicts that r j (t , (ε1, ε2)) >
r j (t , ε1). A similar contradiction occurs if r j (t , ε2) > r j (t , ε1).
• ϕ j > r j (t , (ε1, ε2)) > max{r j (t , ε1), r j (t , ε2)}: in this case,
by Equation 2, uj ((ε1, ε2)) = uj (ε1) = uj (ε2) = 0. By the
relation of preferences and utility [12], (ε1, ε2) ∼ ε1 ∼ ε2.
This contradicts that r j (t , (ε1, ε2)) > max{r j (t , ε1), r j (t , ε2)}.
• r j (t , (ε1, ε2)) ≥ ϕ j > max{r j (t , ε1), r j (t , ε2)}: by Equation 2,
we have uj ((ε1, ε2)) = c j · α j (t) and uj (ε1) = uj (ε2) = 0.
By the relation of preferences and utility [12], (ε1, ε2) ≻
ε1, (ε1, ε2) ≻ ε2 and ε1 ∼ ε2, where ≻ denotes strictly pre-
ferred to. If ε1 ∼ ε2, then (ε1, ε2) ∼ ε1 ∼ ε2. This contradicts
that (ε1, ε2) ≻ ε1, (ε1, ε2) ≻ ε2.
Thus, ri (t , (ε1, ε2)) ≤ max{ri (t , ε1), ri (t , ε2)}.
Proof of Theorem 2
If the information is vertical, by Lemma 1, we have E(α ′i = 1) ≥
E(α ′′i = 1). If the information is horizontal, by Lemma 2, ri (t , (ε1, ε2)) ≤
max{ri (t , (ε1)), ri (t , (ε2))}. By Equation 2, there are three cases:
• ϕi ≤ ri (t , (ε1, ε2)) ≤ max{ri (t , ε1), ri (t , ε2)}: in this case,
backer i will contribute for both conditions, E(α ′i = 1) =
E(α ′′i = 1) = 1.• ri (t , (ε1, ε2)) ≤ max{ri (t , ε1), ri (t , ε2)} < ϕi : in this case,
backer i will not contribute for both conditions, E(α ′i = 1) =
E(α ′′i = 1) = 0.• ri (t , (ε1, ε2)) < ϕi ≤ max{ri (t , ε1), ri (t , ε2)}: in this case,
backer i will not contribute if given (ε1, ε2), i.e., E(α ′′i = 1) =
0. If given either ε1 or ε2, backer i will either contribute or
not contribute, i.e., E(α ′i = 1) ≥ 0.
Therefore, E(α ′i = 1) ≥ E(α
′′
i = 1).
Proof of Lemma 3
⇐= If the right side holds for all t ′ ≤ t , i ∈ It ′ , then ∀t ′ ≤ t :
|s(t ′)| − |s(t ′ − 1)| ≥ P/G = (t ′ − (t ′ − 1)) · P/G. According to
Proposition 2, ∀i ∈ I (t) : (s(t ′), t) ≿ (s(t ′−1), t), where t ≥ t ′. That
is, immediate disclosure is always preferred by all the backers in
the campaign.
=⇒We prove it by contradiction. Assume, to the contrary, that
|s(t ′)| − |s(t ′−1)| < P/G such that DPim (t) is optimal for some i, t ′.
Without loss of generality, we let |s(t ′)| = |s(t ′ − 1)| + |∆s |, where
|∆s | < P/G . Since |s(t ′)| = |s(t ′ − 1)| +∑j ∈I(t ′) α j (t ′) · P/G , where
αi ∈ {0, 1}, we have |∆s | = ∑j ∈I(t ′) α j (t ′) · P/G < P/G . Therefore,
|∆s | = 0, which indicates that |s(t ′)| = |s(t ′ − 1)|. According to
Proposition 1, ∀t ≥ t ′ : (s(t ′ − 1), t) ≿ (s(t ′), t), which contradicts
the supposition that DPim is optimal.
Proof of Lemma 4
We prove it by contradiction. Assume, to the contrary, that: DPim
is not optimal for some d(i, t ′) = (s(t ′), t ′). This indicates that at
time t ′ ≥ t , the entrepreneur could possibly profit by delaying
information disclosure. Without loss of generality, we assume that
d(i, t ′)opt = (s(k ′), t ′) is the disclosure strategy used in the optimal
disclosure policy for backer i ∈ I(t ′) , where k ′ < t ′. Depending
on the relation between t and k ′, there are two cases (since t ′ ≥ t ) :
(i) t ≤ k ′ < t ′; (ii) k ′ < t ≤ t ′.
• t ≤ k ′ < t ′: at time t ′, the project has already succeeded,
which means there is no uncertainty for backer i since the
campaign’s PoS is 1. Therefore, delaying disclosure does not
increase backer i’s estimate on PoS, which contradicts the
proposition that d(i, t ′) = (s(t ′), t ′) is not optimal.
• k ′ < t ≤ t ′: at time t ′, backer i’s estimate ri (t ′,d(i, t ′)opt ) ≤
1, while ri (t ′,d(i, t ′)) = 1. That is, d(i, t ′) ≿ d(i, t ′)opt (∀i ∈
I(t ′)), which contradicts the proposition that DPim is not
optimal.
B EXPERT ALGORITHMS
Random Selection
The random algorithm picks the project status s(ksel ) at random
from s(k) ∈ Hi (t) with equal probability. The expected increase of
revenue ϒ(s(k), i, t) is computed by averaging the revenue received
when the entrepreneur disclosed the project status s(k).
Greedy Selection
The greedy selection algorithm chooses the project status s(ksel )
based on the empirical responses that the entrepreneur has received
from the backers, using a one-step-look-ahead approach.
At time t , given the disclosure strategy d(i, t) = (s(k), t), the
entrepreneur establishes a historical belief ϒold (s(k), i, t) of the
expected increase in the revenue, where i ∈ I(t), and s(k) ∈ Hi (t):
ϒold (s(k), i, t) =
1
nk (t)
·
t−1∑
t ′=1
∑
j ∈I(t ′)
α j (t ′)
η(t ′)/η(t) , (8)
where nk (t) denotes the times that s(k) has been revealed to back-
ers up to time t . α j (t ′) is backer j’s action given disclosure strat-
egy (s(k), t ′). η(t ′) = |s(t ′)|/t ′, and η(t) = |s(t)|/t are the revenue
growth rates up to time t ′ and t , respectively. Note that ϒold = 0 if
nk (t) = 0 or t = 1.
The historical belief represents the entrepreneur’s estimate of
the average revenue she receives by revealing project status s(k) to
the backers, with discounting of the revenue growth rates. It is a
rough estimate of revenue increase that d(i, j) = (s(k), t) brings.
At time t , the entrepreneur’s temporal belief ϒtmp of the ex-
pected increase in the revenue given the disclosure decisiond(i, t) =
(s(k), t), is determined as follows:
ϒtmp (s(k), i, t) =
∑
j ∈I(t−1)
α j (t − 1)
|I(t − 1)| , (9)
whereI(t−1) denotes the set of backers in the campaign at time t−1
and α j (t−1) is backer j’s action at time t−1. If |I(t−1)| = 0 or t = 1,
then ϒtmp = 0. The temporal belief captures the latest decisions of
the backers that will most probably stay in the campaign at time t .
The entrepreneur estimates the belief of the expected increase
of revenue, given d(i, t) = (s(k), t) for backer i ∈ I(t), with the
following equation:
ϒ(s(k), i, t) = (1 − λ)ϒold (s(k), i, t) + λϒtmp (s(k), i, t) , (10)
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is the learning rate (we use λ = 0.1).
The greedy algorithm then selects the project status s(ksel ) by
using the following equation:
s(ksel ) = argmax
s(k )∈H
ϒ(s(k), i, t) . (11)
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The probability for selects the project status s(ksel ) is 1 and 0 for
others.
ϵ-Greedy Exploration
In ϵ-greedy exploration, with probability ϵ the algorithm selects a
random choice s(k). Otherwise, with probability 1 − ϵ it selects the
greedy choice determined in Equation 11.
Pr (s(k)) =

1 − ϵ + ϵnk (t ) , if Equation 11
ϵ
nk (t ) , otherwise
(12)
where nk (t) is the times that s(k) has been reveled to backers up to
time t , ϵ = c/nk (t), and c ∈ [0, 1] is a constant. Note that ϵ = c if
nk (t) = 0.
Softmax Exploration
Softmax selects the choice using a Boltzmann distribution [33].
At time t , the algorithm selects choice s(k) with the probability:
Prob(s(k)) = eϒ(s (k ),i,t )/τ∑
s (k )∈Hi (t ) e
ϒ(s (k ),i,t )/τ , whereτ = max{µ,Ct /lognk (t)}
is the temperature parameter. Here, µ = 0.0001, τ = 1when nk (t) =
0, andCt is determined by:Ct =maxs(k1),s(k2)∈Hi (t ) |ϒ(s(k1), i, t)−
ϒ(s(k2), i, t)|. The softmax exploration selects each choice with a
probability that is proportional to the average ϒ.
REFERENCES
[1] Ajay Agrawal, Christian Catalini, and Avi Goldfarb. 2014. Some simple economics
of crowdfunding. Innovation Policy and the Economy 14, 1 (2014), 63–97.
[2] Ajay K Agrawal, Christian Catalini, and Avi Goldfarb. 2011. The geography of
crowdfunding. Technical Report. National bureau of economic research.
[3] Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian, and Mohamed Mostagir. 2016. A Dynamic
Model of Crowdfunding. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics
and Computation. ACM, 363–363.
[4] Ricardo Alonso and Odilon Camara. 2016. Bayesian persuasion with heteroge-
neous priors. Journal of Economic Theory 165 (2016), 672–706.
[5] W Brian Arthur and David A Lane. 1993. Information contagion. Structural
Change and Economic Dynamics 4, 1 (1993), 81–104.
[6] Pak Hung Au. 2015. Dynamic information disclosure. The RAND Journal of
Economics 46, 4 (2015), 791–823.
[7] Albert Bandura. 1989. Human agency in social cognitive theory. American
psychologist 44, 9 (1989), 1175.
[8] Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris. 2016. Bayes correlated equilibrium and
the comparison of information structures in games. Theoretical Economics 11, 2
(2016), 487–522.
[9] Dirk Bergemann and Martin Pesendorfer. 2007. Information structures in optimal
auctions. Journal of Economic Theory 137, 1 (2007), 580–609.
[10] Dirk Bergemann and Achim Wambach. 2015. Sequential information disclosure
in auctions. Journal of Economic Theory 159 (2015), 1074–1095.
[11] David Blackwell et al. 1953. Equivalent comparisons of experiments. The Annals
of Mathematical Statistics 24, 2 (1953), 265–272.
[12] Christopher P Chambers and Federico Echenique. 2016. Revealed preference
theory. Vol. 56. Cambridge University Press.
[13] Massimo G Colombo, Chiara Franzoni, and Cristina Rossi-Lamastra. 2015. In-
ternal social capital and the attraction of early contributions in crowdfunding.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 39, 1 (2015), 75–100.
[14] Jacob W Crandall. 2014. Towards minimizing disappointment in repeated games.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 49 (2014), 111–142.
[15] David Easley and Arpita Ghosh. 2015. Behavioral mechanism design: Optimal
crowdsourcing contracts and prospect theory. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth
ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. ACM, 679–696.
[16] Matthew Ellman and Sjaak Hurkens. 2015. Optimal crowdfunding design. Avail-
able at SSRN 2709617 (2015).
[17] Charles AR Hoare. 1962. Quicksort. Comput. J. 5, 1 (1962), 10–16.
[18] Daniel Kahneman. 2003. A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping
bounded rationality. American Psychologist 58, 9 (2003), 697.
[19] Emir Kamenica andMatthewGentzkow. 2011. Bayesian persuasion. The American
Economic Review 101, 6 (2011), 2590–2615.
[20] Paul Kau and Lowell Hill. 1972. A threshold model of purchasing decisions.
Journal of Marketing Research (1972), 264–270.
[21] Kickstarter. 2017. Kickstarter Stats. https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats.
(2017). Online; accessed November 10th, 2017.
[22] Ludmila I Kuncheva and Christopher J Whitaker. 2003. Measures of diversity in
classifier ensembles and their relationship with the ensemble accuracy. Machine
learning 51, 2 (2003), 181–207.
[23] Venkat Kuppuswamy and Barry L Bayus. 2015. Crowdfunding creative ideas:
The dynamics of project backers in Kickstarter. (2015).
[24] Venkat Kuppuswamy and Barry L Bayus. 2017. Does my contribution to your
crowdfunding project matter? Journal of Business Venturing 32, 1 (2017), 72–89.
[25] Gwo-Guang Lee and Hsiu-Fen Lin. 2005. Customer perceptions of e-service qual-
ity in online shopping. International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management
33, 2 (2005), 161–176.
[26] Alessandro Marelli and Andrea Ordanini. 2016. What Makes Crowdfunding
Projects Successful Before and During the Campaign? In Crowdfunding in europe.
Springer, 175–192.
[27] NathanMarwell. 2015. Competing Fundraising Models in Crowdfunding Markets.
Available at SSRN 2777020 (2015).
[28] Ethan Mollick. 2014. The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study.
Journal of Business Venturing 29, 1 (2014), 1–16.
[29] Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. 1999. Algorithmic mechanism design. In Proceed-
ings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing. ACM,
129–140.
[30] Mesrob I Ohannessian, Mardavij Roozbehani, Donatello Materassi, and
Munther A Dahleh. 2014. Dynamic estimation of the price-response of deadline-
constrained electric loads under threshold policies. In American Control Confer-
ence (ACC), 2014. IEEE, 2798–2803.
[31] Stephen G Pauker and Jerome P Kassirer. 1980. The threshold approach to clinical
decision making. New England Journal of Medicine 302, 20 (1980), 1109–1117.
[32] Luis Rayo and Ilya Segal. 2010. Optimal information disclosure. Journal of
Political Economy 118, 5 (2010), 949–987.
[33] Sheldon M Ross et al. 1996. Stochastic processes. Vol. 2. John Wiley & Sons New
York.
[34] Wen Shen, Alanoud Al Khemeiri, Abdulla Almehrzi, Wael Al Enezi, Iyad Rahwan,
and Jacob W Crandall. 2017. Regulating Highly Automated Robot Ecologies:
Insights from Three User Studies. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference
on Human Agent Interaction. ACM, 111–120.
[35] Wen Shen, Vahan Babushkin, Zeyar Aung, andWei LeeWoon. 2013. An ensemble
model for day-ahead electricity demand time series forecasting. In Proceedings of
the fourth international conference on Future energy systems. ACM, 51–62.
[36] Wen Shen, Cristina V. Lopes, and Jacob W. Crandall. 2016. An Online Mechanism
for Ridesharing in Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand Systems. In Proceedings of
the Twenty-fifth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-16).
475–481.
[37] Jeremy C Short, David J Ketchen, Aaron F McKenny, Thomas H Allison, and
R Duane Ireland. 2017. Research on Crowdfunding: Reviewing the (Very Recent)
Past and Celebrating the Present. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 41, 2
(2017), 149–160.
[38] Vitaly Skirnevskiy, David Bendig, and Malte Brettel. 2017. The influence of inter-
nal social capital on serial creators’ success in crowdfunding. Entrepreneurship
Theory and Practice 41, 2 (2017), 209–236.
[39] Jacob Solomon, Wenjuan Ma, and Rick Wash. 2015. Don’t wait!: How timing
affects coordination of crowdfunding donations. In Proceedings of the 18th ACM
Conference on CSCW. ACM, 547–556.
[40] Roland Strausz. 2016. A Theory of Crowdfunding-a mechanism design approach
with demand uncertainty and moral hazard. CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11222
(2016).
[41] Roland Strausz. 2017. A Theory of Crowdfunding: AMechanismDesignApproach
with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard. American Economic Review 107, 6
(2017), 1430–76.
[42] Xuanming Su. 2007. Intertemporal pricing with strategic customer behavior.
Management Science 53, 5 (2007), 726–741.
[43] Ina A Taneva. 2015. Information design. University of Edinburgh (2015).
[44] Peter Whittle. 1988. Restless bandits: Activity allocation in a changing world.
Journal of applied probability (1988), 287–298.
[45] Sandy Yu, Scott Johnson, Chiayu Lai, Antonio Cricelli, and Lee Fleming. 2017.
Crowdfunding and regional entrepreneurial investment: an application of the
CrowdBerkeley database. Research Policy 46, 10 (2017), 1723–1737.
[46] Yong-Pin Zhou, Ming Fan, and Minho Cho. 2005. On the threshold purchasing
behavior of customers facing dynamically priced perishable products. University
of Washington (2005).
